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[1469] 
Symposium: The Legal Dimension of 3D 
Printing 
The New Steam: On Digitization, 
Decentralization, and Disruption 
Deven R. Desai* 
Digitization is the new steam. Steam allowed us to leverage like never before and 
spawned a series of new offerings and new needs. The steam era started with many 
competitors and inventors and ended with only a few concentrated winners. The 
winners contributed vast amounts to society and spawned a need for new laws, from 
antitrust to product liability to intellectual property to securities, and more. Just as 
steam disrupted old industries and fostered new ones, digitization is providing the 
same changes today. Digitization opens the door to decentralized production, lower 
costs, and disruption of incumbents, but digitization does not mean perpetual 
disruption is at hand.  
 
In this essay, I begin to set out why new, centralized winners will emerge. Digitization 
spawns an abundance of person-to-person transactions but with the problems of 
impersonal transactions. Copyright industries were some of the first to experience the 
change from few to many producers. Technologies such as 3D printing, synthetic 
biology, and nanotechnology further the shift from centralized to small and local 
production. Although some champion disruption and new businesses, a paradox of 
centralized production and markets with fewer players is that such sectors are easier 
to regulate. The ability of almost anyone to make guns, sell harmful software, or 
produce other sophisticated offerings removes that easy pressure point. Put 
differently, even though digitization enables decentralized, lower-cost production, 
economic questions will remain. We must understand what they are and why they 
persist to see what the future may be.  
 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law and Ethics, Georgia Institute of Technology, Scheller College of 
Business; J.D. Yale Law School. This Article has benefitted from the input of Brett Frischmann, the 
attendees of The Legal Dimension of 3D Printing Symposium at the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law, and the Hastings Law Journal editors. I thank all for their help.    
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In simplest terms, transactions costs related to safety, quality, property rights, 
contracting, and knowledge may be more acute in a digitized, decentralized world. I 
offer that companies such as Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, Google, Apple, Amazon, and eBay, 
have thrived, in part because they have enabled decentralized production to operate 
at scale. In addition, as established players understand digitization and network 
technology better, they have adapted to the new marketplace. For example, rather 
than giving consumers a music or video file, part of the copyright industry has shifted 
to streaming music and video. Consumers have access to the content with no fear of 
malware but lose the ability to manipulate that content. This strategy could be used 
to limit 3D printing and other creative technologies. Instead of having design files 
that can be altered, consumers will stream a file for the specific design. Many may 
welcome this shift, because they are not tinkerers but instead are simply consumers 
who want a safe, stable product or service. But that stability flows from centralized 
players. In short, this era of disruption and decentralization will likely pass and new 
winners, who will look much like firms of old, will emerge, if they have not already.  
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The explosion of decentralized production challenges core, unstated 
presumptions in the law. Of late, 3D printing has caught the attention of 
business and academia. 3D printing fascinates us as a potential Star Trek 
replicator, but it is not there yet. Given the ever-increasing ease of 
making physical things at home, however, 3D printing promises to 
unleash creativity and challenge incumbent industries much the way 
digitization challenged and reordered the music, book, and film 
industries. It is easy to think that this technology relates mainly to 
intellectual property (“IP”). But the Hastings Law Journal has smartly 
put together a symposium to look at this technology in a broad context. 
As the symposium’s sessions reveal, not only IP law, but also tort and 
sector specific laws such as gun and food and drug law, struggle once 
digitization takes hold. I am honored to write this Introduction because it 
provides the opportunity to begin engaging with the larger implications 
of digitization and society.  
Much of our current system rests on an unacknowledged 
equilibrium. Our system assumes that specialization, division of labor, 
and large markets work in a certain way, or at least that the system is 
somewhat static regarding these matters. Digitization and networking 
technology alter that balance in every industry they touch. One way to 
think about these effects is whether the way we regulate an activity 
scales. That is: what happens once digitization takes a practice that was 
once limited to a few actors, and allows almost anyone to engage in it? 
The answer is that our premises and systems are disrupted. I offer that 
the simplified story—that much of our legal system flows from the rise 
and nature of industry in the steam and railroad era—is both accurate 
and flawed. It is accurate in that our laws tend to operate well when 
dealing with limited numbers of actors. Those actors tend to be firms, 
and they are often large ones. It is flawed, because when technology 
changes those premises, the system falters.1 The claims that emerged to 
explain or justify the old system do not work as well as they used to, and 
the fights over government policy are fierce. The task is to set out why 
these fights occur and how to identify questions for policy going forward. 
Although digitization affects more than IP law, the first area where 
digitization began to show cracks in the system, IP is instructive regarding 
digitization, decentralization, and disruption. Intellectual property tells a 
story. The tale is one of public goods.2 The cost to develop a patent, 
 
 1. Cf. Douglass C. North, Capitalism and Economic Growth, in The Economic Sociology of 
Capitalism 41, 45 (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg, eds., 2005) (“[W]e are evolving 
political/economic/social structures that are radically different and more complex than any in our past 
and therefore the evolving human environment has no historical precedent from which to derive 
theoretical inspiration.”). 
 2. Many authors have documented and explained this point. For an insightful exploration of the 
problems with the relationship among public goods, natural monopoly, and IP policy, see Shubha 
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make an album, or write a book is high; the cost to make many copies 
afterwards is low. The cost to infringe is low, because the developer 
incurs risk and costs while others can appropriate the work once it is 
publicly available. Without structures in place to protect that initial 
investment, why would anyone produce these goods? Yet the fights over 
music copyright ownership and distribution revealed that the music 
business and the policies around it assumed that costs to make and 
distribute copyrighted goods would be high forever. With digitization, 
those costs dropped. A flood of infringement followed. But a flood of 
new works followed as well. Digital tools that had allowed garage bands 
to record and mix music at home improved to the point that expensive 
studio production was not necessary except for highly sophisticated 
work. Digital distribution meant that refined and widespread creation 
was no longer limited. The claim that music would stop being produced 
was proven false.3 The incumbents had to retool their business models. 
High cost intermediaries and distribution networks changed. A world of 
four or five major labels controlling close to eighty percent of the market 
shifted, and a host of smaller labels produced more music. Artists sold 
their work directly to consumers. Apple’s iTunes, Amazon, and Google 
Play began selling singles at ninety-nine cents to a dollar and thirty cents. 
Rhapsody and Spotify developed subscription services. Concerts became 
a major source of income. After some legal fights, YouTube came up 
with a system to allow rights holders to identify potentially infringing 
works, and offer ways to make money for uses previously too expensive 
to negotiate, even through rights collectives such as the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, or Broadcast Music, Inc. 
In sum, digitization and network technology shifted the way music is 
created, sold, and monetized. 
The market changed, but it was not destroyed. The specialization, 
division of labor, and type of market that accompanied early forms of 
music production were less necessary. Key transaction costs relating to 
quality and production went down. At the same time, protecting rights, 
enforcing agreements, and integrating dispersed knowledge in society 
posed new challenges.4 Some of those were met. Some incumbents were 
unhappy as new entrants rose to dominance, but that is not a legal 
problem. That is competition in a market. 
This history makes it easy to think that digitization and networking 
affect only IP. That is a mistake. These shifts are just the beginning of a 
full overhaul of our economic and related legal structures. 3D printing is 
 
Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 1125, 1157–58. 
 3. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A 
Research Agenda, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 141 (discussing other incentives to create copyrighted works). 
 4. See North, supra note 1, at 47. 
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an excellent example of technology that opens the door to both desired 
and feared outcomes, and challenges assumptions in our legal and 
economic systems. Although the technology has important implications 
for IP, it also reveals the larger disruptions fostered by digitization. To 
reiterate, the need for specialization and division of labor decreases, 
which alters the analysis of what the law is and should do. 
Technology always poses opportunities and problems for businesses, 
as well as the laws that inform and shape business practices. At certain 
times, these laws seem to support a wide range of activities. At other 
times, these laws seem to hinder a wide range of activities. The ability to 
use 3D printing technology to make guns provides but one example of 
the way technology can shift commercial activity and our understanding 
of what is and is not permissible. As Rory K. Little argues, the 
technology distracts from the core issues about gun regulation.5 Yet the 
shift in technology calls into question how much our society wants to 
embrace ubiquitous gun ownership. It also rubs against the myth and 
reality of an individual being able to design and make items for personal 
use.  
Under federal law, anyone can make a gun at home. This rule may 
stem from deference to certain views about the Second Amendment. It 
may also have been unexamined, because until recently, the cost and skill 
needed to make a gun at home was high. Using lathes and milling tools, 
understanding material science, and so on, is not simple. In the parlance 
of computers, making a gun at home is not plug and play. Even that 
barrier is, however, dropping. For example, a company called Carbide 
3D LLC is developing a home milling machine that it hopes to sell for 
two thousand dollars. As they put it, a Computer Numerical Control 
(“CNC”) mill can make the perfect prototype and is a tool “at the heart 
of the manufacturing industry.”6 Carbide’s mill can be used to cut a 
variety of materials, including plastics, wood, aluminum, brass, bronze, 
tooling boards, wax, and foam.7 Carbide has not yet tested the mill’s 
ability to cut hard metals.8 The shift to lower-cost, home ready CNC 
machines, combined with 3D printing’s rapid advances, shows that the 
number of people who can make a complicated and potentially 
dangerous item at home is limited only by the cost of the machine and 
the materials—both of which are becoming less of an obstacle. But, there 
is still some skill involved in assembling the parts. As with buying 
furniture from IKEA, there will likely be instructions on how to deal 
 
 5. See generally Rory K. Little, Guns Don’t Kill People, 3D Printing Does? Why the 
Technology is a Distraction from Effective Gun Controls, 65 Hastings L.J. 1505 (2014). 
 6. See Carbide 3D LLC, The Nomad CNC Mill, Kickstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/ 
projects/178590870/the-nomad-cnc-mill (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
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with “some assembly required.” A relatively unskilled person can now 
make a sophisticated, dangerous item. Thus, the legality and ideal of a 
rugged individualist making a gun at home was less of an issue, because 
so few could plausibly do it. 
Automobiles raise similar issues, and show why firms play a special, 
underappreciated role in regulation. If one buys a kit and assembles a 
car, the normal safety requirements do not apply. This fits the 
industrious home inventor image. Yet, with 3D printing, groups are 
making cars with a crowd-sourcing approach. Designers who may not 
have had a chance to design cars for Ford or Toyota join together online 
and design a car to specific cost goals. Car parts are digitized and shared 
for enthusiasts and repair shops to use in vehicles already on the road. As 
more people design cars and car parts for personal manufacture, the 
effect of little to no safety regulation will go up. The ability to regulate 
those practices will go down. The same applies to guns. A commercial-
level gun manufacturer is easier to identify and license than a home one. 
In short, digitization democratizes almost any sector it touches. There is 
an irony here. Any technology that opens the door to large-scale 
experimentation and invention by garage inventors or home hobbyists—
or that offers even simpler beneficial effects like sharing books and music 
so others can learn—reduces, if not removes, the need for a centralized 
manufacturer or distributor. Therefore the ability to have centralized 
control and regulation of the sector is lower as well. Widely distributed 
practices are more difficult to regulate. That is not new, but it is more 
acute with digitization.9 
The key lesson is not that a given technology causes the problem. As 
Little argues, the issue should turn on the practice we wish to regulate 
and not the technology.10 If we want to prevent unlawful possession and 
use of guns, certain cars on the road, or any item that poses a problem 
for society, trying to limit the technology is a mistake. The issues should 
turn on the products of technology and their disfavored uses. At the 
 
 9. As discussed below, another irony is that digitization can also be used to increase the amount 
of control and regulation possible. Thus, another mistake is to assume that information wants to be 
free or cannot be governed. Privacy and surveillance literature regarding state and private sector 
monitoring have developed this critique at length. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Beyond Location: Data 
Security in the 21st Century, 56 Comms. of the ACM 34, 36 (2013) (explaining that increased ability to 
track data for security reasons allows for increased surveillance); Julie E. Cohen, What is Privacy For?, 
126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904, 1912 (2013) (“A society that permits the unchecked ascendancy of 
surveillance infrastructures cannot hope to remain a liberal democracy. Under such conditions, liberal 
democracy as a form of government is replaced, gradually but surely, by a different form of 
government that I will call modulated democracy because it relies on a form of surveillance that 
operates by modulation. Modulation and modulated democracy are emerging as networked 
surveillance technologies take root within democratic societies characterized by advanced systems of 
informational capitalism.”). 
 10. See generally Little, supra note 5. 
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same time, as Ben Depoorter shows, digitization “creates unique 
practical, as was well normative obstacles that render all forms of 
property rights enforcement troublesome.”11 It is the tension between a 
given outcome—such as the ability to produce a gun or living tissue at 
home—and the general questions of regulation and property rights that 
denies easy answers for how to address increased digitization. 
Intellectual property again provides insights about the problem. 
Ambiguity about what is allowed can open the door for new 
businesses, or it can deter and even defeat a new entrant. The problem is 
that one cannot know how the law will perceive issues raised by new 
technology.12 In addition, the potential benefits to incumbents, new 
entrants who increase competition, and consumers are not clear. As 
Depoorter has explained, “[t]he initial ambiguity of the socioeconomic 
implications of a new technology can be illustrated, for example, by peer-
to-peer music exchanges. The music industry discovered that huge profits 
could be made by delivering music in a compressed format (MP3) only 
after such exchanges were already relatively common.”13 Even before 
that moment in copyright history, one could argue that the music 
industry was blind or missed the importance of digitization until deep 
shifts in the market had already taken hold.14 The deeper irony is that the 
music industry thought it understood digitization. It was at the table and 
negotiated for significant limits on one type of digitization during the 
drafting of the Audio Home Recording Act. The carve out for 
recordable CDs and the use of a computer to record music probably 
seemed innocuous, because everyone was thinking about recording onto 
audiocassette, the next step in the dominant medium for home copying. 
The audiocassette was the source of copying feared by the industry, so 
the standard move was to limit the future of the technology. Of course, 
that shift did not work. Nonetheless the music industry did not vanish. It 
reoriented its practices, and new leaders emerged. 
Some take these changes to mean the end of scarcity or creation of a 
world of overabundance, but that interpretation misses the rise of new 
firms and market demands that remain even in a digitized world. 
Nonetheless, Jeremy Rifkin has argued that we are approaching zero 
marginal cost: 
 
 11. Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing: Decentralized Piracy, 
65 Hastings L.J. 1483, 1486 (2014).  
 12. Id.  
 13. Ben Depoorter, Technology & Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1830, 1841–42 (2009). 
 14. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 
99 (2002) (“Even with the introduction and rapid popularity of digitally-encoded compact disks (CDs) 
and the proliferation of microcomputers beginning in the early 1980s, the record industry did not 
appreciate the dramatic changes that would be brought about by the emerging digital technologies.”). 
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At the heart of capitalism there lies a contradiction in the driving 
mechanism that has propelled it ever upward to commanding heights, 
but now is speeding it to its death: the inherent dynamism of 
competitive markets that drives productivity up and marginal costs 
down, enabling businesses to reduce the price of their goods and 
services in order to win over consumers and market share. (Marginal 
cost is the cost of producing additional units of a good or service, if 
fixed costs are not counted.) While economists have always welcomed 
a reduction in marginal cost, they never anticipated the possibility of a 
technological revolution that might bring marginal costs to near zero, 
making goods and services priceless, nearly free, and abundant, and no 
longer subject to market forces.15 
Mark A. Lemley has made a similar claim: “Economics is based on 
scarcity. Things are valuable because they are scarce. The more abundant 
they become, they cheaper they become. But a series of technological 
changes is underway that promises to end scarcity as we know it for a 
wide variety of goods.”16 
The shifts that arise here are not ones of utopian replicators, and 
they are not truly about scarcity at all levels. As Lemley notes, costs to 
infringe played a major role in infringement in the music and copyright.17 
As Gerard Magliocca and I offer in our work on 3D printing, costs to 
infringe have played a large role in keeping the patent system stable.18 
Patent law requires the disclosure of how to make the subject of the 
patent; yet infringement is not rampant.19 The costs to infringe—building 
a factory, buying materials, learning design, and so on—were high; the 
digitization of things reveals that those costs are dropping. 3D printing, 
synthetic biology, robotics, nanotechnology, and more do not end 
scarcity. They erode the need for, or alter the role of, large firms.20 They 
indicate that fewer firms are needed for specialization and that division 
of labor becomes rarefied. Thus, if we accept that in some cases, as in 
movie or pharmaceutical production, there is a public goods and a 
related IP problem, maybe it is true that there would be an under-
 
 15. See Jeremy Rifkin, The End of the Capitalist Era, and What Comes Next, Huffington Post 
(Apr. 1, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/collaborative-commons-zero-
marginal-cost-society_b_5064767.html. 
 16. See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity 1 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper 
No. 2413974, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=24a13974. 
 17. Id.; see generally Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345 (2004) (documenting this shift in 
costs).  
 18. See generally Deven R. Desai & Gerard Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and 
the Digitization of Things, 102 Geo. L. J. (forthcoming 2014). 
 19. As Ghosh explains, if public goods or natural monopoly logic is to justify IP, the costs 
argument faces a problem. Ghosh, supra note 2, at 1159 (“Complex chemical and industrial processes 
protected by patent are not cheap to copy. In these cases, where fixed costs are not high and the costs 
of copying are not low, arguments for intellectual property protection seem not to parallel natural 
monopoly arguments at all. Instead, the rationale lies more likely in natural rights or authors’ rights.”). 
 20. Cf. Lemley, supra note 16, at 6 (noting that IP is a type of regulation). 
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production of the goods or services that we think we want. But when a 
sector demonstrates not just copying, but increased production, new 
entrants, and new offerings, the scarcity that has disappeared is the 
scarcity of producers in that sector. Rather than a small number of firms 
competing and producing, there may be a large, distributed number of 
machines and/or firms that can produce a good or service. In such 
sectors, Lemley is correct that we are entering “a world without scarcity,” 
but it is a specific type of scarcity.21 Insofar as a given world or industry 
relies on IP to sustain it, the justification for that IP becomes difficult to 
maintain at least on a public goods argument.22 But these changes affect 
areas beyond those governed by IP and public goods problems. Two 
business areas, hotels and taxis, help see this point. 
The hotel and taxi industries have been stable for years, but now 
both industries have had to cope with newcomers. Thanks to online 
exchange services and GPS, barriers, such as the cost of connecting with 
customers, dispatching cars, and knowing the layout of a city, have gone 
down.23 Services like Airbnb, which allow people to turn their homes 
into small hotels, and Uber or Lyft, which allow people to use their cars 
as taxi services, are changing the hotel and taxi industries. Some value 
Airbnb at $10 billion—more than Hyatt or Wyndham hotels—and one 
informal taxi service recently raised $250 million in venture capital 
funds.24 The incumbent industries have argued that the upstarts are not 
complying with health, safety, insurance, tax, and other regulations.25 
Those regulations are costs that the newcomers currently evade. Yet they 
still have costs for the rooms, food, cars, and other amenities that 
customers want. Although lower costs play a role here, these services are 
less scarce, because the need for specialized offerings and division of 
labor has gone down. Anyone can be a hotel operator or taxi driver on a 
part-time basis with an asset that otherwise sits idle, such as an extra 
bedroom or a car sitting in a garage. 
Put differently: even with digitization, economic questions will 
remain, but we must understand what they are and why they persist to 
see what the future may be. Douglass North captures a paradox that goes 
with transaction costs. Greater specialization, division of labor, and a 
large market increase transaction costs, because the shift to impersonal 
transactions demands higher costs to: 1) measure the valuable 
dimensions of a good or service; 2) protect individual property rights; 
 
 21. Id. at 1. 
 22. See id. at 5–6 n.5. 
 23. Rifkin is correct that digital networks are a big reason that these new offerings can emerge.  
 24. See The Sharing Economy: Remove the Roadblocks, The Economist (Apr. 26, 2014), 
available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21601257-too-many-obstacles-are-being-placed-
path-people-renting-things-each-other-remove. 
 25. Id. 
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3) enforce agreements; and 4) integrate the dispersed knowledge of 
society.26 Standardized weights and measures, effective laws and 
enforcement, and institutions and organizations that integrate knowledge 
emerge, but the “dramatic increase in the overall costs of transacting” is 
“more than offset by dramatic decreases in production costs.”27 
Digitization forces us to revisit these issues. 
With digitization, we are seeing an abundance of person-to-person 
transactions, but with the problems of impersonal transactions.28 In each 
example of digitization’s challenge to an industry, a pattern emerges. In 
the early stages, the technology lowers production costs and thus reduces 
the need for specialization and division of labor. That opens to the door 
to person-to-person transactions and permits evasion of many 
transaction costs. Music moves freely across the Internet. Homeowners 
let rooms to tourists. Designs are shared, and physical items such as toys 
are made at the consumer’s home rather than a factory. Cars are turned 
into taxis. In each case, laws—including IP, tort, and public safety—may 
apply. However, in the early phases, these organizations may ignore 
these laws or believe them inapplicable as to the services they are 
providing. And, regulators may not demand compliance, in part because 
the offerings are small or do not fit into easy categories. The lack of 
regulation and the nature of digitization allow the new offerings to scale 
quickly. In one way, the shift is a return to face-to-face transactions. And 
yet the market is now dispersed. Instead of repeat players, we have many 
buyers and sellers, or purveyors of files, or offerors of rides, or guests in 
one’s rooms.29 Each case presents middle stage problems as the offerings 
mature. Without repeat players, these businesses could fail.30 Sellers may 
rip off consumers; consumers may cost too much to track down and 
prosecute (think of a guest who destroys an Airbnb room). Taxi drivers 
may crash and fail to have insurance. Goods made with a 3D printer may 
choke a child or cut someone. Music, video, or design files may damage a 
computer. As incumbents start to see threats, they make a range of 
arguments against the new players—they are committing theft (IP), are 
unsafe (3D printing, synthetic biology, taxis, Airbnb), or are scofflaws for 
not paying taxes and complying with regulations. Law and policy makers 
must be careful not to take the claims at face value. 
 
 26. See North, supra note 1, at 47. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Ko Kuwabara, Affective Attachment in Electronic Markets A Sociological Study of eBay, 
in The Economic Sociology of Capitalism, supra note 1, at 269. 
 29. Cf. North, supra note 1, at 46 (noting the problems of “shift[ing] from personal to impersonal 
exchange” involve “reciprocity, repeat dealings, and the kind of informal norms that that tend to 
evolve from strong reciprocity relationships”). 
 30. See generally Kuwabara, supra note 28, at 268 (studying eBay and how feedback, even if 
motivated by emotional and gift-giving factors rather than purely rational ones, thrives because it 
addresses the repeat player problem). 
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The new options may not fit our current notion of how things should 
work, but that may be because the new options are just that: new. We 
have no good point of reference from which to assess them.31 And the 
arguments may be directed more at protecting an incumbent business 
and rent seeking than at desired outcomes for society and the economy 
as a whole.32 The outcries of incumbents matter not because lawmakers 
ought to heed the cries. The outcries let people know something has 
changed. Poor press, the threat of new regulation, or potential legal 
action may force private adaptations, such as building reputation systems 
(eBay), requiring insurance (Uber), developing tools to aid enforcement 
of rights (YouTube’s content ID), or creating a robust, third-party 
clearinghouse (Amazon Marketplace). Other responses, such as 
commons-style management or cooperative norms within communities, 
may also emerge.33 These responses track North’s point about what 
happens with moves away from face-to-face business, but reveal that 
there is not one simple solution. 
Closer inspection reveals that digitization could easily lead to a new 
wave of specialization, division of labor, and large markets with a few 
players controlling much of the market and new modes of regulation and 
control taking hold.34 The quality problem—dubious music files, 
potentially poor design files for 3D printers, trust of unknown sellers and 
 
 31. This idea is sort of a Kuhnian moment, in that with a true paradigm shift, the incumbents and 
devotees of the old system will fail to recognize the new way of thinking and instead stay with 
commonly held beliefs. See, e.g., Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology 
Studies 25 (2004). (Kuhn sees scientific education as “authoritarian, militating against skepticism in 
favor of specific general beliefs.”); cf. North, supra note 1, at 46 (“The set of mental models, 
categories, and classifications of the neural networks that have evolved in our belief system through 
which the new evidence gets filtered has no existing pattern that can correctly assess the new 
evidence.”). 
 32. North, supra note 1, at 46. 
 33. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Still Disenchanted? The Modernity of Post-Industrial 
Capitalism, in The Economic Sociology of Capitalism, supra note 1, at 79. 
 34. Cf. Lemley, supra note 16, at 41 (noting a possible “dystopian” future where “a few large 
companies get the right to decide what sorts of innovation are permissible”). I am not sure that these 
groups will get to decide what is possible directly, but insofar as Lemley is pointing out that just as 
previously powerful, incumbent industries shaped rules and practices for their ends, so too can the new 
ones. The argument shows why we should be cautious about any group’s claims over what is required 
for innovation, especially when an industry demands legal protection or exerts market control. It is not 
a given that technology always leads to a decrease or increase in the number of firms. See, e.g., 
Richard N. Langlois, The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, 
12 Indus. and Corp. Change 351, 379 (2003) (arguing that “the managerial revolution—in this 
interpretation—is a temporary episode that arose in a particular era as the result of uneven 
development in the Smithian process of the division of labor”); Hal Varian, A New Economy With No 
New Economics, N.Y. Times (Jan. 17, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/17/business/17SCEN.html (“It just doesn't follow that lower 
communication costs lead to smaller companies. In fact, Mr. Coase himself said that ‘changes like the 
telephone and telegraphy, which tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially, will tend to increase 
the size of the firm.’”). 
Desai_10 (N. Teixeira) (Do Not Delete) 8/17/2014 4:49 PM 
1480 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1469 
buyers on eBay, Amazon, Uber, or Airbnb—means that firms that offer 
a trust system, enforce rules, protect consumers, or vouch for files can 
provide extra value. The transaction costs problem persists, but the 
private offering absorbs that cost, especially if there is a large scale. 
Monitoring or offering these protections to a few customers might be too 
expensive, but with millions or billions of transactions, the new central 
power can provide a marketplace and charge for its ability to manage 
transaction costs. This change suggests that new oligopolies will emerge. 
In 3D printing or telecommunications, those who control the inputs—be 
they materials or data—will exert great power over the provision of the 
commodities. In other areas, iTunes, Google, Amazon, Netflix, and 
others may be the new powers, because they can offer solutions to the 
rights holders’ interest problem.  
Although incumbents may seek new laws to protect their positions, 
the irony is that they can exert the same, and perhaps more, power 
thanks to the very technologies they fight. It is not just the Stop Online 
Piracy Act, Protect IP Act, or other legislative efforts that threaten a 
world of easily shared digital content.35 By offering streaming music, 
video, and ebooks, companies can limit the way a consumer can interact 
with the content. It is digital rights management in disguise. Any 
company in the design business could leapfrog the problems of copyright 
by making their design files available as streams to a networked 3D 
printer. Instead of relying on a scan and copy of a given auto part, a 
consumer or auto supply store could order the part, the file would stream 
to the printer, and the item would be produced. If one wanted ten items, 
ten purchases (or maybe a bulk discount) would be made, and ten items 
would be made. Although a dedicated person could hack the stream, that 
tactic has not yet become rampant. It may be that the offered price, the 
quality of the service, and the nuisance of hacking the stream explains 
the new equilibrium. The current state of affairs suggests that streaming 
design files would work well. This shift indicates that digitization and 
networking reintroduce the possibility of regulation and centralized 
control. 
At the extreme, the logic of digitization and networking allows the 
state to impose regulations on all players, not just large firms. I have 
argued that digitization and related networking technology changes the 
 
 35. Cf. id. (“The Internet has survived repeated efforts by private parties to lock it down, and it 
seems unlikely after the dramatic defeat of SOPA that anything so draconian will pass, in the United 
States at least. But that was never a guaranteed outcome.”). The odds that private parties will give up 
on trying to lock down the Internet are low. The new force against those habits is the technology 
sector that benefits from a different set of costs and barriers than IP. As long as they are powerful, 
attempts by the copyright industry to lock down information technology may fail. But as digitization 
touches other sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, tourism, and so on, they may band together and 
outspend the technology sector in Congress. 
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scale of many aspects of business, explains why IP may not be needed for 
some industries, and challenges attempts to regulate, because 
enforcement costs are high when the number of players is high. But this 
point can be misunderstood; for as soon as digitization offers a method of 
control, it will be exerted. The domain name industry argued that it could 
not monitor millions of potentially infringing domain name registrations. 
Intermediary liability shield laws followed that logic and protected ISPs 
and host sites, such as eBay and YouTube, from having to police their 
services for potential violations of the law. And yet, pressure from 
incumbents with genuine rights concerns has led to counterfeit 
enforcement systems and YouTube’s ContentID system, which aids 
rights holders in identifying potentially infringing goods. Going forward, 
one can imagine networked cars that are only licensed for personal use 
and require another license to be used as a taxi. Once networked, 
identifying driving patterns to flag suspicious, unlicensed use of a car 
would be possible. 3D printing could evolve to a world where only 
authorized designs are allowed on a machine. 3D printers would go from 
being a general-purpose tool to a dumb box, like a television or DVR. 
The new centers of power would again control the way we create and the 
way we do business. This point returns us to a different type of 3D, the 
3D of digitization, decentralization, and disruption. 
Digitization is the new steam. Steam allowed us to leverage like 
never before and spawned a series of new offerings and new needs. 
Steamboats, railroads, steel, refrigeration, kerosene, electricity, gasoline, 
automobiles, and more followed one after the other, either 
complementing or competing with a new way to take business to a 
massive scale. Digitization is providing the same changes today. Circuits, 
mainframes, pocket calculators, software, hardware, networks, the 
Internet, the domain name system, search technology, broadband, 
cellular phones, mobile broadband, smart phones, tablets, distributed 
computing, big data, and more feed the creation of new businesses and 
challenge old ones. The steam era started with many competitors and 
inventors and ended with only a few concentrated winners. The winners 
contributed vast amounts to society and spawned a need for new laws, 
from antitrust to product liability to IP to securities, and touched almost 
every area of law.  
Digitization is now in the heady period where all seems possible. 
Digitization is breaking down cost barriers and opening the doors for 
newcomers to take on incumbents directly. Digitization also upsets 
incumbents indirectly with new, unexpected substitutes, such as when 
digital cameras made the film market a tiny fraction of what is was. This 
era will likely pass and new winners will emerge, if they have not already. 
Whether the law will explicitly champion the new business models or try 
to meter the winners remains to be seen. In some cases, society will 
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demand laws to manage the problems of new businesses (such as new 
safety laws for homemade cars or toys sold to others and licensing 
requirements for personal taxi services). In others, we will face the 
eternal question of when a market is thriving and offering new, desired 
outcomes and when it is truly stagnant or harmful and in need of 
legislative or regulatory action to fix an imbalance. This symposium’s 
willingness to look beyond IP and engage with business leaders who use 
3D printing technology, inventors, and scholars from a range of 
disciplines shows a dedication to broad thinking, gathering the facts, and 
searching for rich answers to complex problems. That approach should 
allow us to assess whether digitization promotes decentralization, and 
disruption continues, or whether the legal system may be setting the 
balance between stability and instability as correctly as possible. 
Nonetheless, what exactly that balance is, what laws are needed to 
maintain it, and what institutions will foster it are ongoing questions. I 
will continue to pursue them, and I hope many others interested in the 
future of technology law and policy will join the Hastings Law Journal, 
the authors in this symposium, and me. 
